We discuss and evaluate the incentives for vertical expansion and vertical mergers in the payments systems industry paying particular attention to the implications of the existence of network effects in this industry. We assess the incentives of merchants to extend vertically into payments systems, noting that this incentive is maximized when there is significant market power in payments systems and merchants are not sufficiently compensated for the business they bring to the network.
Nonbanks in the Payments System:
Vertical Integration Issues
Complementarity Between Merchants and Payment Systems
Merchants and payment systems are in a complementary relationship. At the completion of a sale, money changes hands. Money changing hands could be in cash or checks, and, for the last few decades, it could also be in electronically-transmitted funds or a guarantee of prompt electronic payment to the merchant. Such electronic payments could come from a company that provides credit to customers (such as a bank organized under the Visa or MasterCard trade names) or from a company that just facilitates transactions (such as American Express) but typically does not provide credit, or directly from the bank where the customer has demand deposits. 1 The "payment system" facilitates the payment to the merchant by guaranteeing that the money is received by the merchant and at the same time can offer a variety of services to the cardholder, ranging from credit services to frequent flyer miles. Irrespective of all these additional services, the main service of a payment system is always complementary to the sale of goods. The left panel of Figure 1 shows a payment platform complementary to many merchants.
Similarly, a merchant typically accepts many payment systems platforms as shown in the right panel of Figure 1 . MERCHANT through Visa or MasterCard is intermediated by both an acquiring bank and an issuing bank. In principle, there are three markets in each such transaction, and surplus for each transaction is divided among these. The three markets are: (i) between the merchant and the acquirer; (ii) between the acquirer and the issuer; and (iii) between the issuer and the consumer. These are three complementary markets where the surplus generated by a transaction will have to be split. The way surplus will be split depends on relative market power in each of these three markets. The extent of market power in each market depends on competition among firms participating in them. Therefore it would not be surprising to see large merchants negotiate special pricing arrangements with card networks.
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The price in the market between acquirers and issuers (the interchange fee) is set by the association to which issuers and acquirers belong (MasterCard or Visa) and is not negotiated bilaterally between an issuing bank and an acquiring bank. The fact that this fee is set collectively may imply a price floor for the overall fee that merchants pay to the payment system.
Incentives for Vertical Mergers
Merchants could extent vertically in payment systems. 4 See Figure 2 . To assess value of a vertical merger or vertical extension we need to analyze the pre-merger and post-merger equilibria. There are many possibilities depending on concentration and market power in each market.
Balanced Market Power
We first focus on a market with balanced market power between merchants and payment systems. For the moment, we assume full compatibility among the components.
This means that any component can be combined with any other complementary component. Compatibility implies higher demand for a component (because it can be combined with more complementary components), but also implies more intense competition between substitute components.
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The problem of vertical integration was first discussed by Cournot (1838). He considered two independent monopolists producing two complementary products, A and B respectively, where A and B had no demand on their own but A combined with B is valuable. Alternatively, he considered a single monopolist producing both A and B. He showed that prices are higher when the two complementary goods are produced by independent monopolists. Thus, a vertical merger of A with B results in lower prices, higher consumers' surplus and higher profits, so it is desirable in every dimension.
However, the effects of a vertical merger are much more complex when the ownership structure is not monopoly in both goods. Consider a merchant acquiring a payment platform (or creating its own) and using it preferentially (say offering discounts to customers using it). In the setup shown in Economides (2006) 
Unbalanced Market Power
We now consider the incentive for a vertical merger when facing concentration in a crucial complement. As we will, see the incentive for a vertical merger is higher when a firm faces concentration in crucial complement. However, large merchants may be able to negotiate more favorable terms with payment platforms and therefore have a lower incentive to get in the payment systems business.
A merchant will see a vertical extension/merger as more profitable if it faces payments systems firms with significant market power that it may bypass through the vertical merger. In general, a large merchant prefers a competitive market in payment systems because competition in payment systems would drive fees that merchants pay to a low level. At the same time, merchants would like compatibility at the network level with all the competing payment systems, even if transactions are done for competing payment systems firms. What merchants, especially large merchants, do not like is the high fees assessed to them as a result of the significant market power that the credit card associations have. Faced with significant market power in an adjacent market, large merchants have significant incentives to enter the payment systems market either through a vertical extension or by a metrical merger. 7 Entering this market would most likely lead to a reduction in payment systems fees even if the majority of transactions happen through the network not owned by the large merchant. 8 As mentioned earlier, Wal-Mart has faced significant obstacles from banks in issuing a credit card.
Advantages and Disadvantages of Vertical Extension of a Company
A good example of the advantages and disadvantages of vertical extension comes from Microsoft. It has 92% market share in operating systems for PCs. Over time, it added functions to the operating system that used to be independent applications or 7 Of course, such incentives are diminished if large merchants are offered special lower fees by payment systems networks.
8 Similarly, in the secondary market for government bonds which was traditionally dominated by the broker-intermediated exchange of Cantor Fitzgerald with over 70% market share before 9/11/2001, four major clients of Cantor created Liberty as a competing exchange. Very soon transaction fees were reduced to half by Cantor which retained its dominant market share. Figure 5 . In payments systems, the cards are incompatible (you cannot do a transaction that is one side on the network Visa and on the other MasterCard), but they often use the same network infrastructure. Additionally, many consumers carry a number of credit cards.
Thus, we have multi-homing, and the effects of incompatibility on market structure are reduced.
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Additional Issues: Pricing in Markets with Network Effects
In markets with network effects, firms can make money from either side of a network or from both sides. In many software markets, a provider can make money from a server or a client. For example, Abode sells Adobe Acrobat but distributes for free Adobe Reader. Similarly, a telephone company can collect money from a caller (as is typical done), a receiver of a phone call (for example in 800 numbers), or from both (for example cellular telephone calls in U.S.). Internet backbones collect money from both parties that send and receive traffic. for its end-user products; and (ii) collects a fee for complementary products to its platform sold by other firms. For example, game platforms (Sony, Xbox, Nintendo) set the price for their game consoles as well as collect licensing fees or royalties from software developers.
Conversely, Microsoft, besides selling Windows to computer manufacturers and end users, also subsidizes in kind complementary applications to its operating system by (i) including in its operating system subroutines that are useful to applications developers but are not useful to end users; and (ii) providing information and resources to application developers. Similarly, in payment systems, firms typically collect money from card holders as well as from merchants. In principle, a payment system could collect money on only one side on the market and subsidize the other side of the market.
Network Effects or Network Externalities?
Often the additional subscriber/user/merchant/content provider is not rewarded for the benefit that he/she brings to others by subscribing to or creating a transaction in a network. Hence there may be "externalities," that is, benefits not fully intermediated by Cantor's secondary market because it controlled 40% of the primary market being the largest primary dealer. 12 This is an example of a strategy to offer discount pricing based on volume to take advantage of network effects. This strategy was very successful for Cantor which kept its dominant position with over 70% market share despite an inefficient trading platform. Similarly, large merchants may be offered better terms because of the liquidity/business they bring to a credit card.
Winner-Takes-Most Markets
Markets with strong network effects where firms can choose to be incompatible exhibit a natural inequality, are "winner-takes-most" markets. In these markets, there is extreme market shares, prices and profits inequality. The market share of the largest firm can be a multiple of the market share of the second largest, the second largest firm's market share can be a multiple of the market share of the third, and so on. For example, the equilibrium market shares can be 66%, 22%, 7%, 2.5%, 1%, … The geometric sequence of market shares implies that, even for small n, the nth firm's market share is tiny. Why do we observe the market share, prices and profits inequality? A firm with a large market share has more complementary goods and therefore its good is more valuable to consumers. Why then isn't monopoly the equilibrium? Why is the equilibrium "winner-takes-most" and not "winner-takes-all"? Because to reach monopoly requires a cut in price that is undesirable to the largest firm.
This type of equilibrium is typically observed in (i) the PC operating systems market; (ii) in software applications markets; (iii) in hits in blogs; (iv) in hits in Internet engines; (v) in market shares of firms in traditional Yellow pages; and (vi) in the size distribution of connections of Internet hosts.
Because of natural inequality in the market structure of network industries, there should be no presumption that anti-competitive actions are responsible for the creation of market share inequality or very high profitability of a top firm. That is, no anticompetitive acts are necessary to create this inequality.
In the payments systems market, customers can use a number of credit cards and similarly merchants honor a number of credit cards. This "two-sided multihoming" may mitigate the effects of incompatibility among payment systems networks. However, the lack of pricing flexibility by payment systems in the fees that merchants pay them, reduce competition among these networks.
Concluding Remarks
We discussed various aspects of the vertical relationship between merchants and payment systems networks. We discussed the two-sided nature of a payment system, the fact that such systems are incompatible, the existence of network effects, the two-sided multihoming nature of the network where users have typically more than one card and merchants honor more than one card, as well as pricing within a payment systems network, such as the network-wide setting of the interchange fee. We further discussed the incentives of merchants to extend vertically into payments systems, noting that this incentive is maximized when there is significant market power in payments systems and merchants are not sufficiently compensated for the business they bring to the network.
